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Improving Human Security in Post-Conflict Cote d'Ivoire: A Local Governance Approach

Serge Armand Yapo, December 2007



Executive Summary



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Conflicts greatly deteriorate human security, as well as the socioeconomic and political environment. For UNDP, democratic governance is a central component of crisis prevention and post-conflict recovery, and post-conflict recovery processes often focus on strengthening democratic governance.

This paper advocates that *local governance institutions* are an important entry point for UNDP when dealing with post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. In general, post-conflict reconstruction processes are often targeted at the national government, and NGOs are frequently employed to deliver services on the ground. The reason is generally a lack of strong and reliable local government institutions in post-conflict contexts.

In the areas where such institutions remain, they have frequently lost their legitimacy to the bribes of warlords and natural resource exploiters. In such situations, local governments do not have the autonomy and the political, administrative and fiscal powers to enable them to perform their duties. However, a centralized approach can make it difficult to engage in bottom-up processes and to effectively reach the most vulnerable segments of the population. At the same time, using NGOs to provide services in a post-conflict situation is not a sustainable strategy for long term development.

This paper will therefore argue that *legitimate local governments should take a lead role in post-conflict reconstruction*. As evidence from Cote d'Ivoire will show, local governments can be instrumental in consolidating democratic governance at the local level by facilitating partnerships and inclusive participation of stakeholders in decision making processes. In Cote d'Ivoire, this resulted in both enhanced human security and improved service delivery, which in turn helped re-build trust and support reconciliation after several years of conflict. In addition to presenting the Ivorian case, this paper will also propose a set of recommendations for further work in the area of local governance and post-conflict reconstruction. The paper is of particular interest for:

- *UNDP's national counterparts*: The paper contains recommendations on how to support local governments to cope with local insecurity, through the transfer of financial authority, by encouraging inclusive participation, and by providing an enabling institutional and legal environment.
- *UNDP Country Offices*: The paper illustrates how COs can strengthen their work on human security through practical programming in the area of local governance, and engage in post-conflict recovery through bottom-up processes.
- *International NGOs*: This paper encourages international NGOs to reassess their interventions in long term conflicts, by shifting emphasis from emergency relief to longer term development approaches and by paying attention to the importance of local institutions and their development.
- *UNDP*: The paper illustrates an example of local governance programming which incorporates a conflict prevention lens, by supporting local governments in implementing local security strategies.

With reference to post-conflict contexts, the main recommendations of the paper can be summarized as follows:

- To recognize and promote the essential role of elected local governments in post-conflict contexts;
- To support locally elected authorities and their administrations to handle local democratic processes;
- To develop post-conflict strategies in a framework of human security;
- To ensure that local initiatives receive the necessary support from national authorities;
- To provide sufficient financial support to local governments for service delivery, with an aim of improving human security;
- To otherwise support local governments to ensure effective service delivery, in order to build trust between the various stakeholders.

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My wish is that this paper will reinforce the commitment to support local governance, for visible and tangible results in post-conflict countries.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	1
1. Introduction	2
1.1 Background to and justification for the paper	2
1.2 Purpose, methodology and scope of the study	3
2. Local Governments: An entry point for improving human security	4
2.1 UNDP's global commitment to local governance	4
2.2 The relevance of local governments for post-conflict reconstruction	4
2.3 Human security: A framework for practical programming	6
2.4 The role of local governments in improving human security.....	7
3. Improving Human Security in Post-Conflict Cote d'Ivoire: A Local Governance Approach	9
3.1 The decentralization process in Cote d'Ivoire	9
3.2 The impact of the conflict on local governments.....	12
4. Implementing PASU: Engaging local stakeholders in enhancing human security in Abidjan.....	14
4.1 The PASU project	14
4.2 Preparing the ground: Conducting local safety audits	15
4.3 Increasing local participation and partnerships: Engaging the stakeholders.....	16
4.4 Stakeholder identification and mobilisation.....	16
4.5 Supporting social cohesion and reconciliation	19
4.6 Safeguarding physical security	21
4.7 Ensuring transparency and accountability in social service delivery.....	23
4.8 Learning from challenges: The microcredit schemes.....	26
4.9 The PASU project: A summary of results and challenges.....	26
5. Conclusion and Recommendations.....	28
Bibliography	30
Annex	34

List of Abbreviations

AU	:	African Union
BTC	:	Belgium Technical Cooperation
CBO	:	Community-Based Organization
CCS	:	Communal Committee for Security
CGQ	:	Area Management Committee
CSO	:	Civil Society Organization
CTAMP	:	Comité Technique d'Approbation des Microprojets ¹
DDR	:	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reinsertion
EFUS	:	European Forum for Urban Safety
FISU	:	Forum Ivoirien pour la Sécurité Urbaine ²
FN	:	Forces Nouvelles
GTZ	:	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit ³
HDR	:	Human Development Report
ICPC	:	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
IDPs	:	Internally Displaced Persons
MDGs	:	Millennium Development Goals
NEPAD	:	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	:	Non Governmental Organization
OECD	:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PASP	:	Poverty Alleviation Strategy Paper
PASU	:	Projet d'Appui à la Sécurité Urbaine ⁴
RBA	:	Rights Based Approach
RBM	:	Results Based Management
SSR	:	Security Sector Reform
UN	:	United Nations
UNDP	:	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	:	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
USAID	:	United States Agency for International Development

¹ *Technical Committee for Approving Microprojects*

² *Ivorian Forum for Urban Security*

³ *The German Agency for Development Cooperation*

⁴ *Project of Support to Urban Security*

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to and justification for the paper

How does one make the shift from emergency relief to sustainable development in post-conflict settings? This paper emphasizes the role of local governments in fostering post-conflict development by improving human security. While emerging from crises and conflicts, one of the most important challenges countries face as a reconciliation and development issue is the lack of security. How does one address the challenges of widespread insecurity? How will communities who have been torn apart and divided by conflicts be able to live peacefully on the same area? How can confidence be rebuilt between civilians and ex-combatants after prolonged periods of fighting and fear, so that everyone can join forces and work together for development? As highlighted by the former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan⁵, these kinds of security challenges go hand in hand with issues of human rights and development.

UNDP, because of its worldwide presence and its mandates in democratic governance and crisis prevention and recovery, appears in a key position to concentrate on these post-conflict issues. Referring specifically to decentralized governance in post-conflict settings, UNDP assumes that *"it is an opportunity to reestablish government services and mobilize communities"*⁶. This paper will illustrate how, in the Ivorian context, a decentralization process and a local governance approach to post-conflict reconstruction helped to progress towards the attainment of those objectives.

The effects of war and conflicts increase, rather than diminish, the importance of local government institutions. Firstly, it is of interest to support local governments in post-conflict settings because they are a legitimate part of the national governance architecture, and therefore have several responsibilities grounded in national legislation. If these obligations are effectively executed, they could help achieve the MDGs. Secondly, while NGOs and charitable organizations often support human security during conflict and post-conflict stages by providing food, water, sanitation, health and educational services, these activities are frequently not conducted with a view to sustainability. Therefore, local authorities should be prepared for the withdrawal of relief agencies. Thirdly, it is crucial for UNDP to consider how to enhance the capacities of local governments for public service delivery and conflict management in post-conflict situations. Finally, there is a strong emphasis in the UN on the importance of human security in post-conflicts settings, and local governments are in a key position to address local human security challenges.

⁵ UN, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary General, March 2005.

⁶ UNDP & CMI, Governance in Post-Conflict Situations, Background Paper, Bergen Seminar series, Norway, May 2004.

1.2 Purpose, methodology and scope of the study

The main purpose of this paper is to advocate for the recognition of local governance as a key entry point for improving human security in a post-conflict situation. The first section outlines the relationship between local governance, human security, and reconstruction and recovery in post-conflict settings. The paper will then examine the case of the PASU project in Cote d'Ivoire, which contributes in helping local governments restore human security in the city of Abidjan. Finally, the last section will suggest a set of recommendations for the future involvement of local governments in post-conflict development.

The paper is based on a literature review, personal interviews with a variety of stakeholders and the author's personal experience of working with the PASU project. The geographical focus is Abidjan, the main Ivorian economic city, which attracted thousands of IDPs during the conflict. The people interviewed include public administration officials at the national and local level, representatives of NGOs and CSOs and members of the general population. Interviews were conducted both in the governmental zone and in the ex-occupied areas.

This paper focuses on the experience of a specific project, and will not cover UNDP's general support programme to Cote d'Ivoire during the emergency stage and the post-conflict process. A thorough examination of high crime rates as well as demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation (DDR) are also issues beyond the scope of this paper, as these responsibilities are with institutions at the national level.

2. Local Governments: An entry point for improving human security

This section will explain why local governments are important for improving human security in post-conflict settings. It will start by outlining UNDP's involvement in democratic governance in general and local governance in particular, and then proceed to discuss the relationship between local governance, post-conflict recovery and human security.

2.1 UNDP's global commitment to local governance

UNDP promotes democratic governance as part of its core practice areas. Democratic governance is characterized by respect for human rights, giving voice to people, holding decision makers accountable, promoting inclusive and fair social interactions, promoting gender equality and focusing on sustainable development. It is an end in itself because it encompasses the quest of individuals and communities for freedom, and for an enhanced social and political environment. In addition, it is a mean to achieve other ends such as the MDGs and human development.

While democratic governance today constitutes a major part of UNDP's work in terms of expenditure, one of the key areas of the organization's work within this practice relates to decentralization and local governance. This is based on the assumption that working on democratic governance at the local level can accelerate improvements in access to basic services by the poor, and in their capacities to make choices and contribute to decision-making processes directly affecting their lives. By supporting local governments, UNDP also seeks to reinforce the capacities of local actors across all sectors, to promote civic participation and partnerships among key stakeholders, and to enhance access to information, increase accountability, and encourage a pro-poor policy orientation at the local level. If these principles are considered important for achieving sustainable human development in regular environments, they are even more crucial in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.

2.2 The relevance of local governments for post-conflict reconstruction

There is no agreed definition of the term "post-conflict setting". However, it is often thought of as a country that has experienced armed conflict and is now in a recovery process, even if conflicts remain in some areas of the country. The various challenges faced by countries emerging from conflicts can be gathered under three governance categories:

- Security sector governance, which usually focuses on the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants. In turn, this enables the free movement of people and return of IDPs;
- Political governance, which regards the exercise of authority in a legitimate and accountable political system, enforcing the rule of law, protecting human rights and promoting reconciliation;
- Socio-economic governance, which seeks to identify sustainable approaches to meet the needs of refugees, IDPs and vulnerable people.

These challenges are often addressed at the national level. The majority of post-conflict reconstruction strategies are state centric⁷, due to the necessity of restoring state legitimacy through its three core functions: security, representation and welfare⁸. However, on the ground the central administration is often so weak that there is insufficient capacity to respond to basic needs. The involvement of NGOs sometimes allows for quick results in the area of reconstruction of infrastructure, capacity development, reconciliation, or health care. But, these NGOs do not always possess adequate contextual knowledge of local areas⁹, and may also undermine the legitimacy of the state. With these challenges in mind, the potential for drawing on local governance institutions in a post-conflict reconstruction process should be considered.

Putting local governments at the centre in post-conflict situations has several advantages. First of all, authorities at the local level are close to the citizen. Most inhabitants in post-conflict countries experience state power and collaborate with public servants only through local governments. This is why, in post-conflicts settings, the re-establishment of legitimate and functional local government institutions is essential as a means for the state to settle down its presence in the periphery¹⁰. In addition, local governance provides an opportunity to develop a locally owned peace building strategy through the participation of the public in security sector reform and in the provision of basic social services. Local governance can give voice to the most vulnerable, empower individuals and build strong communities. Moreover, if local reconstruction programmes are planned in cooperation with the local authorities and well implemented, their cumulative effects can contribute to national peace and stability, and form the basis for sustainable development at the national level. In the light of these advantages, many countries emerging from conflict engage in decentralization processes.

However, researchers recommend a cautious approach to decentralization initiatives, as they may also serve to reignite conflicts. Decentralization processes may reveal new political forces, exacerbate regional differences, and encourage local despotism by increasing the domination of the local majority over the minority¹¹. Other risks include corruption and elite capture¹². Nevertheless, in practice many of these risks can be pre-empted and addressed. For example, Siegle and O'Mahony assert, after assessing the merits of decentralization as a conflict mitigation strategy, that "*decentralization initiatives that support increased levels of local government expenditures, employment, and elected leaders have been less likely to succumb to ethnic conflict.*"¹³

⁷ Goby, Winne, Governance in Post-Conflicts settings, Conflict Research Group, January 2006. UNDP, in its Practice Note on Public Administration Reform, states that "*in post-conflict situations, such as in Sierra Leone or Somalia, establishing some form of credible representative government that can provide essential services is increasingly seen as an essential part of the first stages of post-conflict reconstruction*" (p. 18). Thus, the various political agreements settled in the framework of post-conflict rebuilding have one main objective: rehabilitate some key institutions of the state. It was the case in Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra-Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Cote d'Ivoire.

⁸ Lister, Sarah, Understanding State Building and Local Government in Afghanistan, Crisis State Research Centre, Working Paper no. 14, May 2007.

⁹ Goby, Winne, Governance in Post-Conflicts settings, *ibid*.

¹⁰ Romeo, Leonardo, Local Governance Approach to Social Reintegration and Economic Recovery in Post-Conflicts Countries: Towards a Definition and a Rationale, Discussion Paper for the Workshop "A Local Governance Approach to Post-Conflict Recovery", October 2002.

¹¹ GTZ, Decentralization and Conflicts: A Guideline, Eschborn, 2006.

¹² UNDP, Decentralized Governance for Development: A Combined Practice Note on Decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development, April 2004, p.3.

¹³ Siegle, Joseph and O'Mahony, Patrick, Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy, USAID 2006, p.2.

Therefore, UNDP supports local governance in post-conflict contexts¹⁴ through interventions that *"test approaches, build up trust, experience and national capacity, and help create the motivation to reform at the central level. When local initiatives are linked to a central level programme, this may form the basis for the next steps of a broader reform"*¹⁵.

While there are potential challenges and risks associated with local governance approaches, local governments can play a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction processes and when successful, they can even inform policies and reforms at the national level. The next section focuses on practical programming, followed by a discussion on the framework of human security as a useful foundation for local government interventions in post-conflict contexts.

2.3 Human security: A framework for practical programming

*Good governance and safe cities are reciprocal: where inhabitants are free from fear, and where safety is improved for citizens and neighborhoods, interaction among people, among groups and with the public institutions becomes possible. This in turn creates an enabling environment for the inhabitants in the city, for the quality of their life and for economic development*¹⁶.

Human security, recognized by UNDP since the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR), does not have a singular definition. According to Jolly and Deepayan¹⁷, *"it is primarily an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual"*. UNDP supports several countries recovering from violent conflicts, such as Sierra Leone and Afghanistan¹⁸, within a framework of human security. The human security framework proposed by the UN Commission of Human Security for countries recovering from violent conflicts¹⁹ focuses on ensuring public safety, addressing immediate humanitarian needs, launching rehabilitation and reconstruction, emphasizing reconciliation and coexistence, and promoting good governance and empowerment.

In a post-conflict context, the lack of human security increases, and addressing this issue is crucial to a successful reconstruction process. The concept of human security underlines the protection of two main freedoms for the individual: *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*. In post-conflict situations, the idea of freedom from fear involves safeguarding individuals from all kinds of violence, such as increased crime rates, revenge killings, reverse ethnic cleansing, human rights violations, and interpersonal violence (in particular gender based violence). These kinds of freedoms are usually related to security sector governance and political governance. Freedom from want relates to their immediate needs for a decent life, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter for the returnees, employment for youth and adults, and education for children. These issues are closely linked to socio-economic governance.

¹⁴ UNDP considers area based activities as one option for addressing conflict related development issues. See UNDP, Supporting Capacities for Integrated Local Development: A Practice Note, Nov. 2007, p. 13.

¹⁵ UNDP, Public Administration Reform: Practice Note, Bureau for Development Policy, New York, 2003.

¹⁶ UN-Habitat, Safer Cities Programme.

¹⁷ Jolly, R. and Deepayan, B.R., The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports: A Review of Experiences and Currents Debates, UNDP, NHDR Unit, May 2006. This paper will not engage in the theoretical debate around the relevance of the concept, the author sharing the views developed by Jolly and Deepayan, p.9.

¹⁸ UNDP, Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected Countries, 2006; UNDP Afghanistan NHDR 2004, Security with a Human Face.

¹⁹ Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, New York 2003, p. 61.

The important thing to emphasise is that *governance and human security are mutually reinforcing*.

The concept of human security, which is people centered, recognizes the role of local governments as key actors of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and DDR procedures, since these processes and their related challenges are usually localised in nature. It is not uncommon that donors and international NGOs target individuals, communities and CSOs directly when supporting post-conflict processes, while ignoring local governments. However, as UN-Habitat, the UN focal point for Local Authorities, affirms, it is necessary to focus on elected local governments because they are "closest to and most representative of their constituencies". They are legitimate, acquainted with local issues, and accountable to an electoral mandate. Based on this, local governments should take leadership of local post-conflict reconstruction processes, while embedding this process in a framework of human security.

2.4 The role of local governments in improving human security

As discussed above, people's feelings of fear and personal insecurity increase in post-conflict settings. People tend to mistrust each other, and to mistrust public authorities. In order to rebuild trust, local governments should help ensure security by promoting reconciliation, social cohesion and respect for human rights at the local level. In this context, encouraging local participation in governance and human security issues is crucial. Local governments can play a particular role in fostering inclusive participation in these areas.

Fostering inclusive participation also means effectively involving stakeholders in all stages of a programme. Managing a process in cooperation with stakeholders wins the commitment and support of those involved for the implementation of a programme, and collectively made decisions supports its sustainability²⁰. Relevant groups of people that might be considered as stakeholders include vulnerable people, traditional and religious authorities, the private sector, local authorities and the media. A central challenge in this regard is how local governments can encourage the participation of all the protagonists who have been involved in a conflict. The approach experimented in Cote d'Ivoire was to mobilize ex-combatants for the delivery of public goods and services, and for the provision of human security in local communities.

More generally, the PASU project in Cote d'Ivoire was conceived and implemented based on the following assumptions linking civic participation, local governance and human security:

- Community based activities which seek to increase security can be inclusive in the sense that they help people connect to each other.
- Community based activities to increase security are democratic because they connect the citizens and their choices to the local government.
- Effective public participation in local governance processes can help achieve a balance of views and perceptions.
- Effective public participation in local governance encourages accountability in service delivery.
- Actions targeting the individuals and their communities can be effective in promoting human security.

²⁰ Opoku, Eric, Effective Stakeholder Participation in the APRM Process for the Promotion of Democratic Governance: A case study of Ghana, UNDP, Oslo Governance Centre, December 2006, p.13.

However, as security gaps in post-conflict settings include a wide range of concerns, such as physical security, freedom of movement of people and goods, maintenance of law and order, sustainable livelihoods as well as reconciliation and democratization, one must also be realistic about the role that local governments can play in situations where a lot of these responsibilities reside with the central state. These and other challenges faced by local governments in post-conflict situations will be explored further in the context of Cote d'Ivoire.

3. Improving Human Security in Post-Conflict Cote d'Ivoire: A Local Governance Approach

This section will present the history and context of local governance in Cote d'Ivoire, where the crisis expanded a decentralization process that had begun before the conflict emerged, and outline some of the effects of the conflict on the local government's situation.

3.1 The decentralization process in Cote d'Ivoire

For decades, Cote d'Ivoire was an area of stability and prosperity. In the early 1990s, a severe economic crisis coupled with a long political instability finally led to a failed coup in September 2002. The attempted coup sparked a civil war and split the country in two parts: the south under the control of the government, and the north in the hands of the rebels, known as the "Forces Nouvelles". Since then, the country has been experiencing the most severe crisis of its history, with several unsuccessful attempts by the international community to bring the conflict to an end. However, in March 2007 the two main parties to the conflict signed the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, following a direct dialogue initiated by the President. The leader of the Forces Nouvelles (FN), the movement which controls the north, has been appointed Prime Minister, and progress has been made in the area of political reconstruction. With regard to security sector governance, negotiations are ongoing for the establishment of an integrated army. As far as socio-economic governance is concerned, several emergency initiatives targeting refugees, IDPs and civilians in general have been implemented. Programmes intending to tackle unemployment²¹ and promote the MDGs²² have been launched, while other initiatives have focused on gender issues²³. However, the unstable and interrupted nature of the process has hampered attempts to develop a long term vision for development, and different failures have underlined the difficulties of rebuilding democratic governance in a post-conflict context. Achieving results highly depends on the willingness of different actors at the central level to move forward. In this landscape of multiple challenges, one of the most important achievements in the implementation of development and human security programmes has been in the arena of local governance.

The current landscape of local governments in Cote d'Ivoire is neither a construction of the rebels nor the result of any peace agreement, but had been established before the conflict broke out. Until 2001, local governments in the country were only made up of municipalities²⁴. Considering that local authorities are close to the citizen and familiar with

²¹ The central government is preparing, with the support of UNDP and other donors, a civic service which will deal with the unemployment and particularly the reinsertion into the labour force of ex-combatants through civic education, vocational training and development of activities with high employment intensity and infrastructure reconstruction.

²² UNDP supported the country in elaborating a pilot project in the city of Tiassalé.

²³ UNDP, UNFPA and other UN Agencies established an orientation framework for integrating gender issues into their post-crisis country programmes.

²⁴ Decentralization began in Cote d'Ivoire by the parliamentarian law 80 – 1180 of 17 October 1980 related to the municipal organization creating municipalities. These municipalities were not immediately operational due to the lack of specific competencies transferred to the *communes*. A 1985 law transferred 8 powers to municipal officials, but they did not corresponding to local needs and municipal officials did not have the material capabilities for their execution. Moreover, the central authority had a very strong and powerful role of supervision: the Ministry of Interior had the capacity to approve, to suit a preliminary authorization or to cancel the decisions of the local authorities and then to suspend, revoke or substitute itself to the locally elected. Despite this, a decentralized system has been extended several times as a government priority, to reach the number of 198 *communes* all over the state. In 2005, 520 new *communes* had been created.

their realities, and therefore in a good position to foster development at the local level, the current President decided to expand local government institutions. As a result, in 2001 a new parliamentary law set up an institutional local government framework made up of three functional types of local authorities²⁵: the districts, the departments, and the *communes* or municipalities which are closest to the inhabitants. Although the districts and the departments are constituted of several *communes*, there are not hierarchical links between these local bodies. They are independent in their structural and functional frameworks, and are organised as collegial boards with deliberative and executive organs.

The establishment of the districts and the general councils was a response to the need to reduce the significant disparities between the various geographical areas, by issuing them with a certain amount of resources to be invested in local development challenges. To ensure the sustainability of the process, the law of 2001 clearly defined local governments as being fully responsible for development at the local level. In 2002, decentralization was an important element of the Poverty Alleviation Strategy Paper (PASP), as a national government policy aimed at fostering people's participation and reducing regional disparities. Moreover, a law adopted at the end of 2003 transferred 16 powers that had previously been concentrated at the central state to the various local governments²⁶.

As a matter of fact, the military crisis which occurred in 2002 did not really allow the local governments to perform their duties. Although many of them established local development plans that took into account post-conflict reconstruction²⁷, these post-conflict reconstruction plans were not implemented, due firstly to resource constraints, as the government did not transfer the funds as originally planned. Secondly, they were obliged, due to the emergency situation caused by the crisis, to focus on meeting basic needs. Nonetheless, some local governments located in the south were able to invest in more long term development programmes, such as rebuilding infrastructure. However, resource constraints and the limitations imposed by the lack of financial autonomy constituted the most important challenges faced by local governments.

Stated differently, the question raised by this process is how useful decentralization is if it is not accompanied by the necessary financial support. Researchers on the issue of decentralization as a conflict mitigation process have concluded that it is difficult to get adequate results if the process does not reach the point of devolution, with transfer of power, resources and decision making authority to the local level. In the Ivorian case, powers had been legally shifted to the local governments, even if the problem of financing the local institutions remains. A law of 2003 outlined fiscal regulations for local governments. But the decrees that should support the shift of financial power to the local level had not been signed at the time of writing, with some ministries and central administrations being reluctant to concede their financial authority. The Head of State, considering decentralization as a central government policy, engaged public servants in facilitating fiscal decentralization during the General States of the Decentralization process²⁸. In spite of this, local governments continue to face very difficult financial constraints.

²⁵ Law 2001 – 476 of 9 August 2001 concerning the orientation of the general organization of the local administration. The law establishes 5 types of local governments: region, district, department, city and commune. Currently only the district, the department and the communes are functional.

²⁶ Loi 2003-487 du 26 décembre 2003.

²⁷ See, for example, the local development plan of Sakassou, a department located under the rebels' zone. The first strategic priority of this plan elaborated in 2003 is reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

²⁸ Actes des Etats généraux de la décentralisation en Cote d'Ivoire, January 2007.

Another challenge faced by local governments in the institutional decentralization landscape is the lack of clarity concerning their roles and responsibilities, and its consequences for service delivery. The law transferring powers to local governments outlined the roles and functions that each local government institution should have. To prevent the eruption of potential power rivalries, the law states that relations between all these local authorities should be guided by the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, interventions at the local level should be executed by the local government which is best placed to do so. In spite of this rule, problems have appeared in the coordination of activities at the district level, particularly in Abidjan. One case in point was the issue of waste management. The responsibility was shared between the municipalities and the district. Following mutual accusations and disagreements, it became clear that these two parties could not coordinate these tasks with one another, so these responsibilities have now been transferred to the Ministry of Health and the city²⁹.

In addition, despite its fiscal autonomy and a clear view of its role, the local government can not be successful if their staff members are not capacitated to effectively handle their duties.

In summary, although the decentralization process in Cote d'Ivoire has been faced with challenges, there have also been important achievements, as illustrated by the table on the following page.

²⁹ Through an ordinance of the Head of State of 4 October 2007.

Table 1: Analysis of the decentralization process in Cote d'Ivoire

Achievements	Challenges
<p><u>Institutional achievements:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased decision making power at the local level; - Integration of decentralization as a means for fostering people's participation in the development process and for reducing regional disparities in the Ivorian 2002 Poverty Alleviation Strategic Paper (PASP); - Reallocation of sixteen (16) operational powers to local governments; - Full responsibility transferred to local governments in planning and implementing development programmes; - Two functional national organizations of local governments (UVICOCI and ADDCI³⁰). <p><u>Technical results:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Handbook on local government budgeting and financial and accountancy procedures (2002); - Handbook on local participatory planning. 	<p><u>Institutional level:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coordination of the different national initiatives involving local governments; - Authority of the local governments on public administration at the local level; - Clarification of the roles and responsibilities of local governments; - Incomplete institutional framework for implementation. <p><u>Economic and financial aspects</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fiscal autonomy; - Accountability mechanisms; - Resource mobilization. <p><u>Management capacities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insufficient monitoring system; - Insufficient capacities of locally elected officials and their teams; - Insufficient participatory planning process at the community level; - Legal framework for professional development of local government employees.

The table shows that although there have been numerous institutional developments which present Cote d'Ivoire as a decentralized state; important challenges remain for local governments to be able to perform their duties. These challenges have been reinforced by the impact of the conflict on local governments.

3.2 The impact of the conflict on local governments

Conflicts often weaken the capacities of local governments to carry out service delivery, and locally elected officials frequently lose their authority and powers to warlords and other de facto leaders³¹. In Cote d'Ivoire, the conflict significantly weakened local governance institutions. There was a quasi destruction of physical infrastructure as well as socio-administrative and judicial data. 91 of the 198 *communes* and 18 of the 56 *departments* fell under the control of the FN. The central administration and the locally elected officials were displaced to the south along with most of their employees and civil servants, so that basic social needs could not be provided. This especially affected the most vulnerable segments of

³⁰ UVICOCI is the «Union des Villes et Communes de Côte d'Ivoire» and ADDCI the «Assemblée des Districts et Départements de Côte d'Ivoire».

³¹ Lister, Sarah, Understanding State Building and Local Government in Afghanistan, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper n° 14, May 2007.

society, such as women and children. In order to fill this vacuum, the FN established their own versions of departments of social affairs which were relayed on the ground by CSOs and NGOs.

However, the FN has never negated the legitimacy and the leadership of the local governments, and its executive board has never expressed any opposition to their return. For example, five years after the beginning of the hostilities, Morou Ouattara, Commandant of the FN at Bouna, said about the President of the General Council of Bouna that: "*He is a politician and I am a soldier. He is the President of the General Council and I do not want to be President of the General Council, nor Mayor nor Parliamentarian. I always call them to come back and build the city*"³². It was also with the agreement of the FN that the General Council of Sakassou held its first meeting in the city 11 months after the beginning of the war. In general, the locally elected bodies could easily return as soon as funds were available for their activities. However, although they claim that they want the locally elected to return, the FN is accused of not sufficiently guaranteeing the security of returning local governments. For example, the President of the General Council of Boundiali accused soldiers previously related to the rebels of having attacked his home in Boundiali in October 2007³³. Nevertheless, such sporadic violence has not undermined the general consensus on the legitimacy of the local governments, which is rooted in their elections being the only ones which did not suffer contestation before the war began.

One may think that only the areas where heavy fighting took place over sustained periods of time can be considered as post-conflict settings. However, in the case of the Cote d'Ivoire, although local governments located under the governmental zone continued to function with their budget and institutional structure intact, their social duties multiplied due to the approximately 750.000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) they welcomed. This high level of displacement caused major challenges related to inadequate supplies of food, water, health services and education, as well as the proliferation of light weapons and HIV-AIDS. Consequently, local governments were quickly faced with a lack of resources. Moreover, the concentration of IDPs on new areas and the difficulty of facilitating their return provided a pretext for land disputes³⁴, which were amplified and used on the political arena. This again underscores the impact of conflicts on the capacities of local governments to deliver services. To cope with these issues, the *communes* of Abidjan implemented a strategy focusing on urban social dynamics with the leadership of the locally elected bodies, as a means of fostering human security. The next section will discuss the PASU project in more detail.

³² In *24 Heures* of 25 October 2007.

³³ Kone Dramane, President of the General Council of Boundiali, in *Nord-Sud Quotidien* of 24 October 2007.

³⁴ Land quarrels in Cote d'Ivoire have existed for a long time. In the 1970s, the Head of State, in order to promote human settlements and forest exploitation, affirmed that the land belongs to its farmer. Many Ivorian and foreign farmers moved from their areas to those where land were available, and worked hard to add economic value to these geographic zones. However, that statement had never been endorsed by any parliamentary law, so the local communities are now claiming ownership of the now cultivated forest. This claim often leads to clashes with fatal casualties. These disputes have been fostered by the land law of 1998, which clearly deny land rights to non-Ivorians. This law triggered heavy opposition from neighbouring countries, whose nationals have developed extended farms on the contested areas.

4. Implementing PASU: Engaging local stakeholders in enhancing human security in Abidjan

The PASU project provides an example of a localised approach for improving human security in a post-conflict situation. Throughout the conflict, local governments in Cote d'Ivoire were involved in the reconstruction process. In spite of the weaknesses of the decentralization process, they attempted to deliver services to the citizens, sometimes with the support of donors. The UNDP and the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) provided support for the PASU project, which aimed at strengthening the capacities of local governments to prevent insecurity in cities.

4.1 The PASU project

The PASU project has been developed by the Ivorian government and several Ivorian mayors, to address the growing urban crime rates and the inability of the national police to respond to these challenges. The project is a joint UNDP-UN Habitat technical partnership which aims at creating a culture of prevention for a safe environment, by helping local authorities, the criminal justice system, the private sector and civil society partners to address urban security challenges and to reduce delinquency and insecurity³⁵. The project was implemented in the 13 municipalities of Abidjan³⁶ for a total amount of USD 4.200.000, funded by UNDP, the BTC and national counterparts through the *communes*. The main expected results are listed in Box 1.

Box 1: Expected results from the urban safety programme

- Elaboration of security policies and prevention measures at the city level;
- Enhancement of security management by security forces in liaison with the municipalities and their communities;
- Improved living conditions for vulnerable and at risk populations;
- Reinforcement of security in the public sector and the local community, as well as civic participation in national prevention policies.

The achievement of these results should foster democratic governance at the local level, by strengthening local governments' commitment to human security issues and by promoting civil society and local organizations' participation in local development processes. Four principles guided the insecurity prevention initiatives (cf. Box 2), which in turn were anchored in the following five step methodology:

- 1- Conducting a local safety audit;
- 2- Creating a coalition of local stakeholders;
- 3- Designing a local safety strategy action plan;
- 4- Implementing the action plan by selecting and financing projects;
- 5- Monitoring and evaluating the interventions.

³⁵Safer Cities promotional booklet, UN-Habitat 2006, p.2.

³⁶This metropolitan phase succeeded the successful completion of a pilot phase launched in 1998 in 3 *communes*.

Box 2: Four principles of insecurity prevention

- Principle 1:** Necessity to emphasize crime prevention to tackle the symptoms and causes of insecurity and violence
- Principle 2:** Obligation to raise community participation and partnership between all stakeholders at the local level, e.g. police
- Principle 3:** Need of a local leadership (the locally elected) in order to achieve the expected changes
- Principle 4:** Actions should be people centered, targeting their areas and their activities

The main feature of the PASU project was its coherent bottom-up approach to strengthening the capacities of legitimate locally elected bodies in preventing insecurity. Although the project was initially designed for peace time circumstances, it was adapted to the post-conflict setting in Cote d'Ivoire. Instead of targeting only urban crime and delinquency, the project was extended to cover other post-conflict issues such as community policing. It also provided opportunities to promote peace time values at the local level.

In practice, the project supported local governments in building their capacity to handle concerted, efficient and sustainable participatory security policies. The municipalities tried to achieve this objective by increasing local participation and partnerships, enhancing community security and providing basic social services.

4.2 Preparing the ground: Conducting local safety audits

In the Abidjan post-conflict context where personal and institutional relations were characterised by mistrust, safety audits were initiated in all municipalities, and selected stakeholders were involved through a continuous process of consultation. The objective of the security audit was to assess the local security situation through an analysis of institutional, informal and social research data. The assessment aimed at analyzing the socio-political and economic environment, identifying critical safety challenges, evaluating existing responses and gathering proposals for policy improvement that represented the citizens' points of view. To conduct the audit, each municipality recruited a new employee who was assigned with coordinating all activities related to the assessments. A challenge faced by these recruitment processes was the lack of technical capacity among the employees of the municipalities. In addition, it was important that such a task be executed by a person with some level of neutrality who would be trusted by people, and with that in mind the position was filled by a person who was not a current staff member of the municipality.

In some cases, it took between four and eight months to complete the safety audit. The lack of available data even at the municipalities' headquarters, the novelty of the project, and the suspicious environment following the fighting made the quest for information arduous. Even if they were committed to the results of the ongoing surveys, there were officials who proposed to stop the process. Feeling pressured to respond swiftly to popular demands, they argued that an empirical appraisal was a satisfactory basis for action. In addition, as the project was restricted to Abidjan, there were separate plans for a safety assessment at the district level, which should support the implementation of cross-municipalities initiatives. However, due to the prevailing mistrust in the local communities, both the Ministry of Interior and the donors maintained that it was better to develop the programme as close to the citizens as

possible³⁷. It was recognised that even if it was necessary to provide emergency responses to the most urgent needs, the local situation audit should not be dismissed, especially as their objective was more wide-ranging than a simple aid supply operation. The security audits therefore went ahead, but the challenge remained of how to best proceed with developing this type of survey as part of a post-conflict reconstruction process.

4.3 Increasing local participation and partnerships: Engaging the stakeholders

It is the role of local councillors, in crisis situations as well as in their daily action, to encourage bringing together all inhabitants of their city regardless of philosophical or sexual orientation, ethnic, cultural and religious membership or legal situation³⁸.

In order to encourage local ownership, a variety of local institutions were involved in the PASU process. At the national level, a director at the Ministry of Interior was appointed as a national focal point for the donors. Officials representing each municipality were gathered in a piloting committee. The project was coordinated by a national project team jointly recruited by the donors, a representative of the national government, and UN-Habitat. At the local level, the initial step focused on preparing the municipalities to take charge of the process and the implementation of the programme. Each municipality recruited a consultant who was trained in urban insecurity prevention and integrated into the municipal administration. Officials from each municipality, because of their legitimacy and their acquaintance with local realities, were appointed to lead the process.

This approach of involving locally elected officials differs from previous practice in supporting local governance in post-conflict contexts. In some post-conflict reconstruction projects developed in Cote d'Ivoire with the financial support of others donors, the implementation was conducted by NGOs and the projects directly targeted to the population. For example, the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (PNDDR) funded by the World Bank, conducts its community rehabilitation operations in the rebel zones directly with local communities, through the support of an international NGO contracted for this purpose. According to staff on the programme, one of the arguments developed by donors in favour of this option was the absence of the local governments, as they had not been able to return after having been displaced to other areas. This raises the question of how to address the case of weak or dysfunctional local governments.

4.4 Stakeholder identification and mobilisation

The identification of stakeholders is important to ensure a participatory process. In the case of the PASU project, the municipal officials let the project teams freely manage the process of determining the stakeholders. However, the individuals proposed by the project teams had to be approved by the heads of the municipalities, in their capacities as the leaders of the

³⁷ Three years later, a quantitative survey on the sentiment of insecurity was conducted in the District by the National School of Statistics and Applied Economics (ENSEA). The main findings of this survey confirmed the results of the local assessments carried out in 2003. The results of the survey have not been widely shared, as some police officials argued that some sensitive data should not be publicly communicated. However, its results have been shared with the heads of the municipalities.

³⁸ European Forum for Urban Security, [Saragossa Manifesto](#), International Conference on Security, Democracy and Cities, 2-4 November 2006, Saragossa, Spain.

process. This approach aimed at reinforcing cohesion and giving voice to a wide range of people.

Due to the fact that there was not reliable data on existing associations and CSOs, and because most local organizations were so politically affiliated that they were not really representative of the people, the project team decided to select stakeholders through the security audit. This facilitated the identification of institutions and individuals with particular interest in security issues. The municipal project teams sought to enrol different categories of stakeholders: those who were *affected by* and those who *significantly affected* a severe security issue; individuals or representatives of CSOs³⁹ who could provide relevant information, resources and expertise needed for formulating and implementing a safety strategy; and, finally, those who controlled implementation instruments. This selection method was highly appreciated by the public, who felt confident that they were going to deal with a politically independent structure.

In practice, enrolling non-institutional actors needed balance. On the one hand, some local institutions and individuals were interested in participating in the process mostly as a means of self promotion. On the other hand, some of those who had been identified as significant sources of insecurity in the city refused to be involved. In Port-Bouët, for example, an association of students called FESCI was said to provoke deep fear among the population due to their systematic use of violence⁴⁰. The local executive board of the association refused the invitation to take part in the PASU process, a decision which pleased some members of the municipal administration who felt that FESCI participation could significantly obstruct developments. This highlights the difficulties of getting those who constitute risks for the local security, mostly ex-combatants and war-lords, integrated into post-conflict participative processes. Although they are frequently not cooperative, local governments can undermine the reconciliation and reconstruction process if they avoid them.

Capacity development was also an important element of stakeholder engagement, in order to facilitate meaningful participation. Some capacity development initiatives catered to municipal officials and local coordinators, and focused on the methodology and practice of managing local development. Other initiatives targeted stakeholders from civil society, to enable them to constructively participate in the process they had become involved in. The substantive focus of the training sessions was the identification of local security challenges and options for addressing them, by planning and implementing interventions and evaluating the results. These workshops on results based management led to the validation of a monitoring and evaluation framework to be applied. Most of the beneficiaries of these capacity development sessions highly appreciated the trainings, and as a result the activities of some CSOs are now results based oriented.

Involving stakeholders in the Communal Committees of Security


One of the main elements of democratic governance is effective public participation, including the extent to which the allocations and decisions that come out of planning and budgeting processes reflect what is really wanted and needed by people. In order to ensure sustained and effective public participation in the PASU process, municipal officials institutionalized

³⁹ Enrolling CSOs is important because they can contribute in various ways to expand participation. For some of these ways, see UNDP, *Mobilizing Poor People for Active Citizenship*, Discussion Paper, Bureau for Development Policy, 2007.

⁴⁰ Violent brawls had already occurred between students living on the campus and inhabitants in the neighbourhood.

community participation through the creation of Communal Security Committees (CCS) with clear duties assigned to them. The coalition of CCS was recognized by a municipal act, so that the whole community could collaborate with its members as a local governance institution. The partnership encompassed a wide range of participants, from municipal officials to anonymous citizens, and included representatives of the national government, traditional and religious leaders, the police, social workers, youth and women. One positive result of this institutionalization of CCS, was that it enabled the members to interact with the local police services on issues regarding community security. Although there was great commitment to engaging the public in the post-conflict process, in some areas the representation rates were not equitable: some of the committees were dominated by professionals who did not live in the municipalities, and although women were involved in the process, it was not on an equal basis.

A good participatory process requires the involvement of stakeholders at each step of the procedure. In each area, the CCS, under the leadership of the head of the municipality, was committed to analysing the development of insecurity, identifying actions aimed at addressing challenges of insecurity, exploring potential partnerships, and monitoring and assessing the implementation of activities, as illustrated in Figure 1.



In general, CCS members showed a great commitment to participate and to implement their mandate. The example of inclusion and transparency modelled by the CCS was so successful in certain localities that it was decided to establish “mini-CCS” in some of their neighbourhoods, in order to further deepen public engagement. However, it was still a challenge to maintain the engagement of those involved. In general, participatory processes of this kind often experience a drop in interest due to participation fatigue, lack of interest after a project has lost its novelty, or because of a wide disparity of interests among those involved. In the case of PASU, there were also stakeholders who did not keep their enthusiasm over time. Delays in the execution of projects, combined with unrealistic expectations of the personal advantages to be gained from participation, eroded their willingness to continue. In many cases, engagement by volunteers suffered in the absence of any financial compensation, which is not unique to projects of this type⁴¹.

Another challenge emerged in establishing local ownership. Although the project was integrated into the municipal administrations, some *communes* did not consider the action plan as an important planning document. Others perceived the CCS as an organization trying to act in the place of the municipal council. Such opinions illustrate the difficulties of building capacities for change among civil servants and local councillors, and the challenge of appropriating new management systems by the local administration.

Expanding the partnership: the Ivorian Forum for Urban Security

⁴¹ See Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick, *Rebuilding the State from Below: Questioning an Orthodoxy*, in *Regards Croisés*, Juin 2005, n°14, p. 21.

In order to sustain the partnerships created at the local level, the municipal officials created the Ivorian Forum for Urban Security (IFUS). The objective of the organization is to place attention on cities as key actors for the prevention of insecurity by:

- sharing experiences at the national, regional and international level;
- building managerial capacities in dealing with insecurity;
- advocating and influencing government and civil society in including local communities' safety concerns in national development strategies;
- mobilizing resources to strengthen their activities.

IFUS has tried, with UNDP support, to achieve these objectives by organizing national meetings and workshops gathering national and international resource persons. For instance, from 2005 to 2007, the organization held conferences on the issues of:

- the contribution of mayors and municipal officials in building security;
- the collaboration between mayors, municipal officials and the police;
- partnerships between mayors, municipal officials and the private economic sector in ensuring security.

These conferences raised the interest of the national authority and CSOs in promoting security at the local level. In terms of city-to-city cooperation⁴², the municipal officials of Abidjan allowed their coordinators to develop the capacity of rural municipalities in implementing the prevention strategy. In terms of international cooperation, the municipal officials were involved in both a south-south decentralized cooperation process with other African countries that benefit from the Safer Cities Programme, and an international partnership with western countries and international NGOs, both with the support of the UN-Habitat. Through this, they attended international forums and received international expertise. In terms of advocacy, the municipal officials were lobbying for increased resource allocations, which would enable them to elaborate and implement local security policies. With regard to mobilizing funds, the European Union (EU) entered the initiative for an experimental phase with USD 200.000 in October 2007. Other potential partnerships and sources of funding are being explored. The challenge for the local governments is now to systematize the participatory approach of addressing national security concerns from a bottom-up perspective.

4.5 Supporting social cohesion and reconciliation

In order to address the numerous security gaps, municipal officials implemented a range of initiatives that were designed to improve security conditions in local communities. In Abidjan, the pillar of their strategy consisted of promoting social cohesion and reconciliation, and safeguarding daily physical security. Throughout the crisis, many NGOs and local organizations were involved in such activities. The local governments⁴³ took the lead of national⁴⁴ and local meetings to foster peaceful coexistence.

⁴² For various examples of city-to-city cooperation as conflict prevention, see: Canada Human Security Research and Outreach Program, [Freedom from Fear in Urban Spaces: Discussion Paper](#), May 2006.

⁴³ Some municipal officials particularly committed themselves to return back to their areas in order to evaluate the impact of the crisis on the local situation. For example, the General Council of Sakassou was the first to hold a meeting in its *department* in June 2003, with the support of the Ministry and the agreement of the rebels.

⁴⁴ At the national level, the UNDP supported a meeting which aimed at identifying the role that could be played by communities in reinforcing social cohesion. The findings of this conference, which led to the design of a charter of local governments in rebuilding social cohesion, have not yet been implemented. The recommendations of this paper will to a certain extent build on these findings.

In the municipalities of Abidjan, initiatives were set up to improve social cohesion in neighbourhoods through the area management committees (CGQ⁴⁵). The CGQs are area-based organizations representing all inhabitants of an area, regardless of their ethnicity, religion or political affiliation. The CGQs aim at gathering everybody around the most important challenges of the area, and look for the best ways to address them. As they are close to the population, they are seen by the municipal officials as an important means of promoting social cohesion. In the municipalities where such neighbourhood organizations already existed, they were confirmed as the interface of the quarter with the local government. Where there were no existing organisations, new ones were established. The CGQs act as early warning system by identifying local threats, analysing their consequences and bringing emerging conflicts to the awareness of the local authorities⁴⁶. This approach was considered successful by many stakeholders. According to one CGQ member, *"the establishment of the CGQs opened a new framework of local dialogue. The particular issues of the area are analyzed during the monthly meetings, and conflicts are managed on a traditional and dialogue basis."* However, a significant challenge related to the CGQs is their lack of management skills. Decisions are made on an empirical basis, and some leaders used the committees to appropriate common goods for themselves, thereby reviving the risks of new conflicts.

When this mechanism for early warning did not succeed in preventing deadly fighting, the municipal officials arranged public reconciliation meetings. The key messages of these meetings were to foster respect for all human beings' fundamental right to life, and to denounce discrimination and exclusion in local communities. In addition, some municipalities, such as Koumassi and Treichville, funded local CSOs to organize days of free legal consultation, as well as public campaigns such as sport for social cohesion and promotion of pedestrian zones and pedestrian rights. These public campaigns achieved the immediate objective of stopping the fighting in some *communes*, such as Anyama, and raised awareness around key neighbourhood issues. Some NGOs, such as Search for Common Ground, supported local communities directly so that they could themselves identify causes of their conflicts and reduce the tension between different groups by strengthening their capacities to transform conflict non-violently through social dialogue. Capacity transfer of such technical skills and methods from NGOs to local administrations is important in order to sustain the post-conflict reconstruction process.

For these reconciliation initiatives, local governments benefited from the support of traditional and religious leaders as well as representatives of the national government. They significantly contributed to the mobilization of the local population, and sometimes sent high level representatives to lead public reconciliation meetings⁴⁷. In order to sustain this participation, the Ministry of National Reconciliation established local committees of

⁴⁵ *Comités de gestion de quartier* in French. The CGQ are not a creation of the PASU. They have existed since the 1990s, with the purpose of fostering local participation. For example, at Koumassi, a municipality of Abidjan, the work of the committees led to the establishment of building plots and the provision of basic social services such as light, water, schools, and health centers.

⁴⁶ In the countryside, some villages instituted informal village committees for land management, in charge of dealing with the numerous quarrels on land issues. These committees mitigate conflicts by using traditional ways of administrating justice. The most difficult issues are sent to the local municipalities and representatives of the national government for conciliation. For more information, see [Projet prévention des crises et consolidation de la paix dans le sud-ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire : 4 études](#), Ministère de la réconciliation et des relations avec les institutions et GTZ, 2007.

⁴⁷ To read more about the contribution of the traditional and religious leaders, see [Projet prévention des crises et consolidation de la paix dans le sud-ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire : 4 études](#), Ministère de la réconciliation et des relations avec les institutions et GTZ, 2007. In a similar context, in Sierra Leone, the chiefs are heavily criticised by the public because of their abuses: Jackson Paul, *Chiefs, Money and Politicians: Rebuilding local government in post-conflict Sierra Leone*, in [Public Administration and Development](#), Vol. 25, pp. 49-58.

reconciliation throughout Abidjan, including the surrounding countryside. However, several other organizations and institutions also established numerous committees to deal with local issues. On the ground, this produced a challenge of coordination, as there was no collaboration between the multiple committees that were established. This challenge must be addressed in order to support sustainability and prevent the outbreak of new conflicts.

4.6 Safeguarding physical security

A major post-conflict challenge for local governments is how to guarantee the physical security of the population, in cooperation with the security sector. In the framework of the PASU project, the local diagnosis pointed out the difficult relations between the national security agents and citizens. The public considered the police as an important cause of insecurity due to the violence and extortion they often exerted, particularly towards drivers and merchants. Another key problem was represented by the self-defence committees, who had been created by youth during the crisis and which gradually transformed into security threats. To solve these issues, the locally elected representatives strengthened their cooperation with the police, and also developed the capacities of the security cooperatives.

Deepening the collaboration with the police

As part of the agenda of the CCSs, the *communes* arranged workshops between the police and the population so that they could publicly share their mutual grievances. These consultations led to increased collaboration. The self-defence committees were dissolved, and the youth were instead engaged in the implementation of community based activities such as waste collection.

Building on this, IFUS organized several meetings with the national police in order to seek avenues of possible collaboration between the municipal officials and the police. A structural challenge was caused by the fact that the police in the municipality are not under the administrative authority of the head of the city, while the law obliges the mayor to provide the police with the useful infrastructure for its functions. However, as a result of the discussions, new arrangements were established at the local level and some heads of the police are now engaged in participatory management of security issues in their areas, in cooperation with the local population⁴⁸. The local commissioners of the police also agreed to pilot an initiative of *proximity police* or *community police*⁴⁹, in which the municipal guards would be a first step for crime information and prevention.

The municipal guards, different from the national police, are part of the local administration. They do not have a clear mandate in the area of insecurity prevention⁵⁰. In practice, they are for the most part in charge of ensuring security of municipal buildings and local authorities. In Abidjan, however, the municipalities attempted to maximise the potential of the municipal guards to help address insecurity, and as a way of addressing the weak human resource capacities of the national police. For example, to counter the lack of traffic lights at many

⁴⁸ In Sierra Leone, a model of Local Needs Policing plan was developed to meet the needs and expectations of the local community while reflecting national standards and guidelines. However the process was interrupted by the civil war in late 1998 and early 1999. In the post-conflict context, the strategy has been deepened and there is now a general acceptance of the Local Needs Policing approach. Brian Thomson, *Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform*, A Chatham House Report, June 2007, p.13.

⁴⁹ For more information on community policing, see Graham, Mathias et. al., *Philosophy and Principles of Community Based Policing*, SEESAC 2003.

⁵⁰ Wale, Ekpo, *Définition de la police municipale*, in Ateliers Police municipale - Secrétaires Généraux - Chefs de service administratifs, UNDP – BIT, Juillet-Septembre 1992.

dangerous crossroads, the CCS of Marcory decided to equip municipal guards with mopeds to facilitate their availability to priority locations around the city. Since then, their presence has been reinforced in various areas, for example at the entrance of schools to help children cross the road.

As recognized by national police officers at the local level, the municipal guards appear as an important first step in managing security issues. However, there are also challenges to this process. Although this initiative has been approved at the national level, the practical terms for its implementation have not been clarified and instability at the top levels of the Ministry of Security is not helping progress in this area. Additionally, the municipal officials can not legally extend their roles until a national law establishes new and clear mandates for municipal guards.

The PASU case illustrates that in the area of the institutional police, it is not enough for the municipal officials to show a great commitment in dealing with day to day security. The local governments do not have sufficient powers in some areas, as they are governed by rules and practices at the central level. The central state should therefore consider the policy proposals developed by local governments in order to achieve better results in the management of cities. While waiting for progress in this area, local governments are involved in another way to face practical security matters in their territories: through developing the capacity of the informal cooperatives of security.

Supporting the informal security cooperatives

The security cooperatives are informal organizations involved in security issues⁵¹. The members of these cooperatives are unemployed youth, some of them former delinquents. The main objective of their activities is to secure public spaces. The cooperatives are now committed to facilitate traffic around the markets and safety at the beach, and some local governments have already integrated cooperatives into the municipal police force. Although the cooperatives have generally been welcomed by the cities' merchants, some have been accused of theft and robbery. The municipal officials, wanting to preserve the value that these groups can add to the security sector, decided to act swiftly to remove the culprits and defined clear terms of reference for the cooperatives' work.

Failing to deal with the militias

One area where local governments have failed to deliver security is in relation to the militias. During the conflict a variety of militias were created in Abidjan, and for a long time they occupied public spaces such as schools. Although local governments were interested in using these spaces for their formal purpose, they never tried; the militias, supported by politicians, seemed to be untouchable. Based on this high level support, the militias committed various forms of abuse. To counteract this, the population of the *commune* of Yopougon raised a public and deadly insurgency against one militia who subsequently moved to another area. However, rather than addressing the root cause of the problem, the problem was shifted from one area to another. This provides another example of the constraints faced by local governments in the security sector as long as supporting national initiatives are not implemented.

⁵¹ These cooperatives are not the same as private security companies, which are formal businesses.

4.7 Ensuring transparency and accountability in social service delivery

Service delivery is at the heart of people's needs in a post-conflict setting. The range of needs which have to be addressed after a period of conflict can be extensive. Through the PASU project, the municipal officials of Abidjan provided numerous services to their citizens. For example, public spaces have been lit; schools have been rehabilitated; youth have been equipped to collect waste; young girls have been employed in the formal sector doing work such as sewing or running small restaurants, and women in rural areas have been equipped with grinders to support their farming activities. As part of this process, local governments had to determine how to best identify which services to prioritise, and also how to effectively deliver them in a manner that was accountable, transparent and hence would reinforce the trust of the public.

Selection processes for service delivery

The choice of which services to deliver was informed by the security audits conducted in the different municipalities, which had pointed out the central causes of insecurity as they were perceived by the population. The persons interviewed during the safety appraisal also made proposals for action. On this basis, the CCSs formulated policies, strategies and actions plans, which were publicly endorsed by the population. This process revealed some managerial challenges, particularly the weak capacities of local actors in developing an integrated action plan. An important lesson learned from this process, is that in a post-conflict context where each need seems to be a priority, it is important to develop the capacities of local stakeholders to *identify* and *classify* needs. Providing the right need at the right time is imperative for the effectiveness of service delivery.

To ensure effective service delivery, a strategy was employed which aimed at dealing with political interests and preventing corruption and mismanagement. To avoid the influence of local political quarrels on the selection of projects, the selection was embedded in a multi-step process. In each *commune*, the project proposals were presented to the local PASU coordination unit. The CCS selected those project applications which were most closely linked to the action plan, which targeted an urgent safety issue, and which could be easily implemented. The selected projects were then assessed at the district level, where a technical committee (CTAMP) had to approve the most relevant projects for the entire district in light of available funds. This technical committee of 15 people consisted of representatives of various ministries and the national government with an interest in security and urban development, and was co-chaired by UNDP and the BTC.

Similar systems of locating the final decision making process away from the municipalities have been used in post-conflict contexts in Central America and Cambodia⁵². On the one hand, this approach ensures some protection against corruption and nepotism at the local level. On the other hand, this delocalization of the final decision from the hands of local administrations can also diminish local ownership, and may in the context of PASU justify the reticence of some parts of local administrations to integrate the PASU action plan as a municipal strategy.

Challenges to timely service delivery

⁵² Salomons, Dirk, Local Governance Approach to Social Reintegration and Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Countries: Programming Options for UNDP/UNDCF Assistance. Paper presented at the workshop "A Local Governance Approach to Post-Conflict Recovery", New York, 08.10.2002.

While timely and effective service delivery was considered important to improve security and build public trust in the PASU project, this was not always possible to achieve. The PASU project funded a wide range of community based projects. The funds were issued by the UNDP either directly to the community workers and NGOs in the case of capacity development activities, or to contractors in the case of infrastructure rehabilitation⁵³. In order to promote local ownership, the designation of the contractors was the responsibility of the local administration which selected the best offer among at least three (3) proposals. The first annual report showed that some of the selected contractors did not really have the technical capacities to achieve the outcomes: some buildings were not finished, while others were not of the expected quality. To prevent further weaknesses in terms of procurement, the CTAMP decided to submit all public contracts to a public procedure of calls of proposals. This, however, raised another challenge of delays in delivery due to the new steps introduced in the process. This in turn caused public mistrust in the project during the period of time prior to service delivery.

The municipalities involved in the PASU had two major obligations; firstly, to contribute to the project by providing office supplies and transport facilities to the municipal assistant, and, secondly, to contribute with funds for the national coordination account. The first responsibility was executed as planned. With regard to their financial contributions, the municipal officials signed administrative acts for the funds to be transferred to the common resource pool. However, treasurers who were responsible for disbursing the funds (and who did not report to the local authorities) opposed the payments. Firstly, they argued that they had not received instructions from the mayor to pay the authorized amount as a priority. Secondly, even in the cases where such instructions were acknowledged, they argued that as a matter of priority, the salaries of municipal employees should be paid prior to any other expenditure. This exemplifies a typical difficulty for local governments to implement their development projects, particularly in a post-conflict situation where multiple financial constraints are common. Nonetheless, the majority of municipalities paid an average of fifty per cent of their contributions, and one municipality, Adjame, contributed with significantly more funds.

The situation was made more difficult by delays in national finance procedures, which had established a system where all the income collected from local governments is gathered in a common basket at the central level before being redistributed back to local governments. Because of this process, funds are not always available to the local governments, who sometimes receive their part of the money half way through the year. Due to the crisis, the financial weaknesses of the system were exacerbated and local governments resorted to developing new partnerships with development agencies in order to access new funds.

In spite of this difficult situation, in the case of PASU donors managed to coordinate their approach. In general, UNDP, the BTC and the national counterparts showed significant commitment to achieving results. They held regular meetings to assess the evolution of the project, harmonize their approaches and ensure coordinated responses to new developments. Among other things, the results of this coordination process resulted in increased funds designated per community development activity.

4.8 Learning from challenges: The micro credit schemes

⁵³ Although this procedure is against the UNDP's rules for a NEX project, national stakeholders and donors considered it safer to let the funds be handled by the institution.

The micro-credit schemes which were established in the framework of the PASU sought to give opportunities to the most vulnerable segments of the population to develop income generating activities. The beneficiaries were obliged to pay back the received funds to make them available for other beneficiaries. To design this mechanism, a proposal was developed by international consultants and later approved by national stakeholders.

Two significant challenges emerged for the micro credit schemes. The first related to the conditions placed on the lenders in order for them to access their funds. More specifically, after consultation with the 13 CCSs, it was decided that lenders had to provide a percentage of the total amount approved by the technical committee. This was aimed at encouraging an entrepreneurial spirit among the beneficiaries, on the assumption that they would show more commitment towards developing an activity in which they had already invested money. However, in reality most of the beneficiaries were not able to make a first payment for their projects.

The second challenge related to the collaboration with the microfinance institutions. The microfinance institutions had been selected after an assessment of the national microfinance landscape and had been identified as the most reliable actors. However, in the implementation of the agreement, they showed little commitment. There were long delays in managing the process, due to numerous changes in the boards of these agencies. In addition, some of the microfinance institutions had other priorities and therefore did not dedicate much time to manage the relatively small amounts of money involved in the micro credit schemes. The numerous initiatives of the national project coordination team to address these issues remained unsuccessful, and the micro credit scheme failed.

4.9 The PASU project: A summary of results and challenges

The evaluation of the joint UNDP–BTC–UN-Habitat funded project PASU highlighted numerous outcomes reached by the municipalities in the area of insecurity prevention, as well as challenges still to be addressed. While the table below provides an overview of this, some lessons learned and future recommendations are also discussed in the following section.

Table 2: Contribution of the PASU in supporting the local governments to improve human security

Activities	Outputs	Contributions to development outcomes	Challenges	Possible actions
Increasing community participation and partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communal Committees of Security institutionalized Several Area Management Committees constituted/consolidated Ivorian Forum for Urban Safety enlarged to include new mayors Collaboration framework with the private sector launched Private sector contributions in implementing local security action plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Practice of sharing information and expertise Participation of CSO area leaders in the design of local development programmes Participation of women, youth and elders in the decision making process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Numerous committees at the local level Effective representation of the most vulnerable people Reluctance of some local officials to a participatory approach Roadmap for collaboration between the FISU and the private economic sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate the committees for increased effectiveness Encourage all citizens to be involved in decision-making processes of public interest Deepen partnerships between CBOs, CSOs, NGOs and local actors Develop the capacity of local administrations for participatory and transparent governance Develop a cohesive plan of collaboration between local government institutions and the private economic sector
Empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Municipal safety audits Survey on security perceptions carried out Municipal Security action plans developed 17 projects managers, 198 municipal officials, around 2000 local actors trained M&E tools drafted Communication tools developed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participative audit and planning practices fostered Capacity Development of local governments and CCS Awareness on social cohesion raised 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Application of the participative approach Weak financial autonomy Weak participatory local planning procedures Weak participatory local budgeting procedures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop legal frameworks ensuring the fiscal autonomy of the local governments Develop leadership capacities of the locally elected to champion community led local governance Deepen citizen participation in setting priorities Deepen local officials' management and coordination skills
Service delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service delivery handbook Income Generating Project Funds available Community driven activities funds available M&E of the projects conducted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial management skills fostered Transparency between the locally elected authorities and the public reinforced Rehabilitation of schools Development of playgrounds for children Support to social services and NGOs dealing with vulnerable children and youth Distribution of small credits funds for implementing micro credit schemes Financing income generation activities for young girls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insufficient financial resources Weak capacities of the local administration to deliver effective services Delays in delivering the goods Weak implementation of the micro credit schemes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fund investments in small-scale infrastructure and social services Integrate local development funds with local budgeting procedures Enhance the capacity and promote value systems of local bodies to ensure easy, quick and affordable service delivery Develop new strategies in the area of micro credit schemes Develop accountability mechanisms

Activities	Outputs	Contributions to development outcomes	Challenges	Possible actions
<p>Ensuring community security</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National police equipped ▪ Municipal police equipped ▪ Local youth cooperatives for safety established ▪ Existence of monitoring and early warning groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Decrease in violence and perception of insecurity ▪ Collaboration with police broadened ▪ Increased awareness of community policing ▪ Increased awareness of the necessity of prevention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Corruption and abuse of the part of the police ▪ Lack of clear powers for the municipal police ▪ Non association of the municipal officials to the DDR process ▪ Difficulties to deal with militias ▪ Lack of respect for the rule of law ▪ Weak capacities of the criminal justice system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promote anticorruption initiatives and strengthen the capacities of the national police to handle public security activities ▪ Develop legal frameworks enabling the municipal police to interact with the national police over a community policing strategy ▪ Reinforce the capacities of the locally elected authorities to develop actions targeting the delinquents, militias, ex-combatants ▪ Achieve just law enforcement promoting human rights and social values ▪ Improve access to justice for the most vulnerable people

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Through the Ivorian case, this paper has shown that local governments, and by extension participatory local governance, can present a key entry point for addressing human security issues in a post-conflict setting. A local governance approach can be effectively used to foster local participation by mobilizing the institutional structure, communities and citizens around a shared development plan, which is inclusive in nature and which also gives voice to minorities⁵⁴. Such comprehensive mobilization of the population can be crucial for providing sustainable responses to local security challenges.

Local governments are well placed to take the lead on this because they are acquainted with the local socio-historical context. As illustrated in this paper, the Ivorian municipal officials and other elected representatives were able to mobilize the population around local social and cultural values related to human rights. They enhanced the reconciliation process at the local level, by supporting area based organizations and addressing daily physical insecurity by initiating community policing, equipping the national police, employing municipal guards and integrating ex-combatants into local security cooperatives. This led to enhanced levels of trust in the community, both among citizens themselves and between the local government and the general public. The participation of a wide range of local actors in the PASU process produced a supportive environment for resolving local tensions and preventing new potential conflicts from emerging.

Although these outcomes can be attributed directly to the intervention of local governments, most post-conflict development strategies at the local level do not target the locally elected officials. Therefore, the objective of this paper has been to emphasize the critical role that local governments can play, in spite of the risks and challenges involved in re-building local government institutions after prolonged periods of conflict. There should be a clear recognition of the need for local governments not only to be involved but to take a *lead* on post-conflict local governance processes at all stages of planning, decision making, budgeting, and monitoring. Building on the achievements of the PASU project, the following recommendations can be made for future programming for local governance and post conflict recovery:

Recognize the essential role of locally elected governments, and strengthen their authority.

The leadership of local governments is crucial for building sustainable governance systems in post-conflict contexts. Specifically, their comparative advantage lies in their ability to mobilise their local constituencies, and their knowledge of the local context. Therefore, promoting the fundamental role of local governments should be a cornerstone of post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Do not rely on NGOs to address long term challenges.

While NGOs can be very important in helping to address emergency needs during and after a conflict, contracting NGOs should not be considered a long-term solution to human security and development challenges. It is important to re-establish, as soon as possible, the capacities of local governments to carry out their duties.

Formulate and implement strategic local governance plans based on human security.

⁵⁴ IDEA/ Baskin, Mark, Developing Local Democracy in Kosovo, 2004, p.24.

An important function of local governments in post-conflict settings is to prevent conflict and to promote sustainable development through service delivery. There is a wide range of activities which can be implemented at the local level towards post-conflict rebuilding process. Initiatives could include establishing a human security focal point, conducting a human security assessment that takes social and cultural values into account, designing an action plan based on human security priorities, and establishing local groups that will be in charge of monitoring the security situation and making early recommendations if there is risk of escalation.

Mobilise all stakeholders at the local level in a participatory process.

The most significant strength of local governance initiatives is the potential to mobilize all inhabitants for active citizenship toward local development. A broad inclusion of stakeholders is important, and could include locally elected politicians, traditional and religious leaders, police services, local intellectuals and researchers, local business groups, NGOs, victims and perpetrators of violence, women, youth, different ethnic/cultural groups, and the media.

Whenever possible, strive to include ex-war lords, ex-combatants and victims in the same process.

One cannot expect all stakeholders to be collaborative. However, this can not be used as a reason to ignore potential 'trouble spots' in the selection of stakeholders. Including ex-combatants in these processes is often crucial, because the achievement of outcomes will often depend on their involvement.

Reinforce the capacities of all stakeholders involved as a basis for long term development.

Conflicts weaken the capacities of individuals, groups and institutions, and prevent them from fulfilling their duties. Therefore, development agencies must make capacity development of local governments and other stakeholders a central feature of their human security related projects. Relevant areas to be targeted include management skills, participatory diagnosis, drafting urban safety and local development plans, development of income-generating projects, and prevention and management of community conflicts. Training should be on demand and contextualised to specific needs, instead of being delivered according to pre-conceptualised curricula.

Local governance initiatives must be supported by the central state.

The potential of local governments to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction processes can only be fulfilled if sufficient financial resources are dedicated to this purpose. This is especially important in post-conflict contexts where tax collection may serve to reignite conflicts. In addition to financial reinforcement, local governance initiatives should also be supported by an enabling legal framework, e.g. in the areas of rule of law and security sector reform, and in relation to procedures for disbursing funds from the central to the local level.

Communicate new policies clearly to all stakeholders.

To encourage local ownership and to obtain the acceptance and active engagement of local stakeholders around a new policy or a new system of management, it is important to adequately communicate new policies and systems to all involved, and to allow for adequate discussion with those who express opposition.

International donors should channel their aid straight to the selected local governments.

This is a means to reduce the risk of funds being diverted at a central level. A good alternative to direct allocation is a central government fund specifically designated for decentralised

activities. The management system of funds should enable the local governments to make disbursements without suffering from bureaucratic delays.

Transparency, accountability and inclusion should be key features of local governance initiatives.

Re-building trust is a critical challenge in post-conflict contexts. If local governments can pursue local development processes in a non-partisan and transparent manner, this will positively affect citizens' trust in these processes and hence the legitimacy of locally elected politicians and local bureaucrats. It is imperative that locally elected politicians and local public service employees are perceived as serving *all* constituents, and not only selected groups.

In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, the role of municipal guards should be further strengthened.

If the process will be continued as formally envisaged by the Ministry of Security, empowering the municipal guards could facilitate important improvements to the local security situation. One possible way of boosting the process could be for the municipalities to engage with parliamentarians who are committed to decentralization as a strategy to meet the needs of the most vulnerable people. Engaging the National Assembly in developing this community police approach may accelerate the procedure of expanding the institutional powers of the municipal guards, and facilitate the interventions of the municipal officials in the area of community security.

Security cooperatives should be extended to other parts of the Cote d'Ivoire.

It is recommended that the approach used in Abidjan towards the security cooperatives be strengthened, as it supports the police in the management of daily security and also provides work for unemployed youth at risk. The security cooperatives can be used as a model at the national level for establishing a civic service or other initiatives that support the reintegration of the ex-combatants. There is demand for this on the ground, as municipal officials in Abidjan have been contacted by previous militia members who want to start a new life. It is therefore also important to associate local governments with the DDR process, and to improve their capacities to identify sustainable strategies for dealing with ex-soldiers in their areas. However, to enable the security cooperatives to successfully implement their functions, capacity development initiatives for their members are needed.

Local governments should adopt Results Based Management (RBM)

Timely delivery of programme objectives is important, in order to build and reinforce the trust of the public. Delays can trigger mistrust, defiance and conflict. Local governments should therefore adopt Results Based Management techniques as a tool to facilitate effective work planning and service delivery.

Remember that addressing human security at the local level requires time, commitment and perseverance.

With all the challenges a post-conflict context provides, the process may require a lot of time, and is also likely to be interrupted by emergency issues. However, it is crucial that post-conflict reconstruction processes take a long term view, and be seen as separate from humanitarian aid operations.

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Annex 1

Illustrative entry points and sequencing for decentralized governance in post-conflict situations

(From UNDP/CMI, *Governance in Post-Conflict Situations* (2004), pp. 12-14.

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016465.pdf>)

SELF-ENFORCING⁵⁵ POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS		
Strategic Entry Point	Immediate Post-Conflict	Medium-Term
<i>Resources, Financing and Investment Mechanisms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rapid financing facilities (e.g. UNDP area Based Programme, UNCDF's LDF, LIFE, etc.) to promote service delivery, etc. - Promote fiscal transfer from central to local authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Funding facilities to fund NGOs, CBOs and other groups for participatory service delivery, infrastructure reconstruction and social reintegration - Developing local authorities' capacity to expand local revenue base - Develop framework of sharing of revenues between central government and tiers of local government
<i>Planning and Budgeting Structures and Process</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Instituting participatory local planning and budgeting procedures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Citizen participation in setting priorities and budget allocation for local service provision - Developing the capacity of local authorities of participatory and transparent governance and in analyzing, planning and monitoring localized reconstruction and development
<i>Institutional Strengthening</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing capacity of local authorities to engage in priority service provision and participatory development - Strengthening the capacity of sectoral state administrative units to provide financial and technical support, etc. to local administrative structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening local officials' management and coordination skills - Developing the capacity of relevant agencies at the regional and national levels to provide financial and technical support to local authorities - Enabling legislative and legal frameworks for political, administrative and financial decentralization and devolution sensitive to urban and rural contexts
<i>Community Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing capacity of local authorities, NGOs, CBOs and other local institutions for participatory development - Legal framework enabling communities to organize and to empower CBOs, NGOs and traditional forms of participatory mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing leadership capacity for community-led participatory local development - Enhancing local capacity to undertake measures for community security and social reintegration - Strengthening capacity to promote partnership among local actors

⁵⁵ A Self-Enforcing Case is one in which one side is overwhelmingly victorious, usually with the defeated party territorially displaced (e.g. post-colonial or separation situations); there is typically substantial consensus in society about political developments in the aftermath of the cessation of hostilities (e.g. Timor-Leste and Eritrea).

MEDIATED⁵⁶ POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS		
Strategic Entry Point	Immediate Post-Conflict	Medium-Term
<i>Resources, Financing and Investment Mechanisms</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rapid financing facilities (e.g. UNDP ABD Programme, UNCDF's LDF, LIFE, etc.) to promote service delivery, etc. - Promote fiscal transfer from central to local authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Funding facilities to fund NGOs, CBOs and other groups for participatory service delivery, infrastructure reconstruction and social reintegration - Developing local authorities' capacity to expand local revenue base - Develop framework of sharing of revenues between central government and tiers of local government
<i>Planning and Budgeting Structures and Process</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - pilot participatory local planning and budgeting procedures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Citizen participation in setting priorities and budget allocation for local service provision - Developing the capacity of local authorities of participatory and transparent governance and in analyzing, planning and monitoring localized reconstruction and development
<i>Institutional Strengthening</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing capacity of local authorities to engage in priority service provision and participatory development - Strengthening the capacity of sectoral state administrative units to provide financial and technical support, etc. to local administrative structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening local officials' management and coordination skills - Developing the capacity of relevant agencies at the regional and national levels to provide financial and technical support to local authorities - Enabling legislative and legal frameworks for political, administrative and fiscal decentralization sensitive to urban and rural contexts
<i>Community Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing capacity of local authorities, NGOs, CBOs and other local institutions for participatory development - Legal framework enabling communities to organize and to empower CBOs, NGOs and traditional forms of participatory mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing leadership capacity for community-led participatory local development - Enhancing local capacity to undertake measures for community security and social reintegration - Strengthening capacity to promote partnerships among local actors

⁵⁶ A Mediated Case is one in which two or more previously warring factions agree to a peace settlement, which typically includes agreement on subsequent political development; however, mistrust usually remains, and, moreover, other elements of society are unable to voice their concerns, given the dominance of the previously warring factions (e.g. Cambodia and Mozambique).

CONFLICTUAL⁵⁷ POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS		
Strategic Entry Point	Immediate Post-Conflict	Medium-Term
<i>Resources, Financing and Investment Mechanisms</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rapid financing facilities (e.g. UNDP's ABD Programme, UNCDF's LDF, LIFE, etc.) - Funding facilities to fund NGOs, CBOs and other groups for participatory service delivery, infrastructure reconstruction and social reintegration
<i>Planning and Budgeting Structures and Process</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Piloting citizen participation in setting priorities and budget allocation for local service provision - Developing the capacity of local authorities for participatory and transparent governance and in analyzing, planning and monitoring localized reconstruction and development
<i>Institutional Strengthening</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing capacity of local authorities to engage in priority service provision and participatory development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening local officials' management and coordination skills - Strengthening the framework for tiers/units of governance and the mandate/coordination - Developing the capacity of relevant agencies at the regional and national levels to provide financial and technical support to local authorities -enabling legislative and legal frameworks for political, administrative and fiscal decentralization sensitive to urban rural contexts
<i>Community Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing capacity of local authorities, NGOs, CBOs and other local institutions for participatory development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Developing leadership capacity for community-led local development - Legal framework enabling communities to organize and to empower CBOs,NGOs and traditional forms of participatory mechanisms - Enhancing local capacity to undertake measures for community security and social reintegration - Strengthening capacity to promote partnerships among local actors

⁵⁷ A Conflictual Case is one in which one side achieves a military victory per se, but there is no comprehensive peace settlement to resolve the very issues that led to and exacerbated the conflict. The risk of renewed hostilities is high (e.g. Rwanda and Afghanistan)